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Most analysis of NAFTA begins by citing the 
huge increase in bilateral trade between the 
U.S., Canada and Mexico since 1993 (Figure 
1).1 If NAFTA were solely responsible for that 
trade, renegotiating it on more favorable 
terms might have big payoffs. However, there 
are seven problems with thinking NAFTA has 
mattered or can matter very much.
1. Trade with Mexico is not big as a share 
of GDP or the trade deficit, despite its 
impressive growth. Exports plus imports 
were 1.4 percent of U.S. GDP in 1994. By 
2015 it was 3.0 percent of GDP (Figure 2). 
The entire U.S.-Mexico trade deficit—not 
the portion of the deficit due to NAFTA, 
discussed below—amounted to $61 billion or 
8 percent of the overall U.S. trade deficit.
2. All international trade ballooned since 
1993—not just among NAFTA countries—
growing much faster than GDP. Trade 
between NAFTA countries grew faster than 
with other countries (Figure 3). Standard 
trade models expect that pattern not 
because of NAFTA, but because its members 
are geographically closer to each other 
than any other trading partners. Trade is 
typically facilitated by lower transportation 
costs and greater familiarity with the 
market. Interestingly, Figure 3 shows most 
of Mexico’s gains in U.S. trade share stalled 
after 2000.
3. U.S.-Mexico supply chain trade grew 
because of other factors. Adding to the 
rising trend in global trade has been an 
upswell of supply chain trade. North-South 
supply chains expanded as they became 
much more practical in the 1990s. Security 
concerns declined in low-wage countries 
in the post-Cold War era, transportation 
costs fell rapidly, and improvements 
in communications and information 
technology facilitated management of 
extensive cross-border supplier networks.  
NOTE  Trade data excludes services and petroleum products. 
SOURCES  UN Comtrade and U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis.
FIGURE 1 — U.S.-MEXICO TRADE AS A SHARE OF U.S. GDP
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The main point is that supply chain trade 
expanded in Europe, Asia, and North 
America in the post-NAFTA period mostly 
in response to new business opportunities, 
not trade policy changes.
 The degree of U.S.-Mexico cross-border 
supply chain integration can be gauged 
by looking at trade in intermediate goods 
(goods meant to feed into the production of 
a final good). They comprise 73 percent of 
U.S. exports to Mexico (Figure 4). The share 
of intermediate goods imported from Mexico 
is lower, at 40 percent (Figure 5).2
 NAFTA has, of course, facilitated North 
American supply chain trade. One of the 
few studies that incorporates supply chains 
found much higher impacts from NAFTA on 
trade than previous studies. In that study, 
supply chains accounted for 25 percent of 
NAFTA’s impact on Mexico’s imports and 33 
percent of NAFTA’s impact on U.S. imports.3 
 On the other hand, it would be hard to 
argue that NAFTA enabled the development 
of supply chain trade more than other types 
of trade. Figures 4 and 5 show no increase in 
the share of supply chain trade after NAFTA’s 
enactment. It appears that while NAFTA 
helped, supply chain trade growth was 
largely compelled by other forces.
4. Both the U.S. and Mexico began lowering 
tariffs before NAFTA. Indeed, the trend in 
U.S. tariffs indicates that Mexico experienced 
a faster decline in tariff preference in the 
U.S. before NAFTA than after (Figure 6). The 
largest drops in Mexican tariff preference— 
preferential treatment for Mexican goods 
relative to goods from other economies—
occurred from 1991 to 1995. While NAFTA 
tariff reductions continued to phase in until 
2009, reductions in tariffs for non-NAFTA 
countries beginning in 1995 approximately 
matched NAFTA reductions.4
 Complementing the tariff evidence, one 
recent study finds that including the general 
trend of U.S.-Mexico trade from 1990 in 
their econometric study greatly diminishes 
the measurable impact of NAFTA on trade.5  
It appears that reforms in Mexico were 
already propelling the bilateral trade 
relationship, which NAFTA mostly served  
to lock in and supplement.
*Assumes NAFTA accounts for 25 percent of U.S.-Mexico trade. 
NOTE  Trade data excludes services and petroleum products. 
SOURCES  FRED, UN Comtrade, and authors’ calculations.
FIGURE 2 — NAFTA TRADE VOLUMES IN CONTEXT (2015)
NOTE  Trade data excludes services and petroleum products. 
SOURCES  UN Comtrade and author’s calculations.
FIGURE 3 — MEXICO’S SHARE OF TOTAL U.S. EXPORTS AND IMPORTS
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5. The Peso Crisis of December 1994 shaped 
trade much more than NAFTA. The peso and 
the Mexican economy fell hard, and Mexico’s 
demand for U.S. goods was decimated. 
Meanwhile the mid-1990s was a period of 
robust growth in the U.S., and demand for 
Mexican goods remained strong. This can be 
seen in the one-time large drop in the trade 
balance in 1995 (Figure 1). In contrast, studies 
have been able to identify virtually no impact 
of NAFTA on the bilateral trade deficit.
 For several reasons, including the 
deepening linkages between the two 
economies, Mexico’s economy has not 
grown much faster than the U.S. economy 
since 1994. This means there has been 
no opportunity to re-equilibrate relative 
demand. As a result, the U.S. trade deficit 
with Mexico relative to U.S. GDP has 
remained constant and close to zero, 
dropping by only 0.2 percentage points 
across the next 20 years. More recently, 
the peso has weakened further, going from 
MX$13 to a dollar in 2014 to MX$22 to a 
dollar in early 2017, fueling greater demand 
for Mexican goods in the U.S. and depressing 
demand for U.S. goods in Mexico. The peso 
has since strengthened, but it remains much 
weaker than it was in 2014.
6. Supply chain trade inflates volume without 
changing the amount of final goods traded 
and consumed. Trade statistics involve 
double counting whenever trade involves 
significant amounts of intermediate goods.6 
Trade statistics capture the full value of the 
traded good, not just the value added by the 
exporting country. If production took place 
in more than one country, double counting 
occurs. Hence, building cross-border value 
chains inflates trade volumes without 
inherently changing the amount of final 
goods traded and consumed.
7. Trade agreements may simply shift trade 
from one importer to another. Neither 
overall trade nor the trade deficit will 
change if American consumers merely 
buy Volkswagens from Mexico instead of 
from Germany or Brazil. The econometric 
evidence on NAFTA is mixed, with the 
strongest evidence of “diversion” occurring 
in the apparel sector in the 1990s.  
NOTES  Intermediate goods are identified using the OECD Bilateral Trade Database by Industry and  
End-Use classification of 6-digit HS92 codes, applied to UN Comtrade data. Trade data excludes 
services and petroleum products.
FIGURE 4 — INTERMEDIATE GOODS AS A SHARE OF U.S. EXPORTS TO 
MEXICO (1991-2016)
NOTES  Intermediate goods are identified using the OECD Bilateral Trade Database by Industry and  
End-Use classification of 6-digit HS92 codes, applied to UN Comtrade data. Trade data excludes 
services and petroleum products.
FIGURE 5 — INTERMEDIATE GOODS AS A SHARE OF MEXICO EXPORTS 
TO THE U.S. (1991-2016)
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RENEGOTIATION CARRIES SIGNIFICANT 
POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS IN MEXICO
It appears that renegotiation matters most 
for its potential impact on Mexico’s political 
dynamics. U.S.-Mexico trade matters more 
for Mexico than for the U.S. As a hot-button 
political issue, NAFTA will have a greater 
effect on Mexico’s presidential elections in 
2018 than it did in the U.S. elections in 2016.
 So far, Mexico’s attitude toward NAFTA 
has been positive. Mexican public opinion still 
seems to favor the agreement, but there is an 
increasing perception that it has been a bad 
deal for the country. Mexico had expected 
NAFTA to help it move much farther than 
it has on enduring problems like poverty, 
inequality, agricultural competitiveness, 
wage growth, and the development of strong 
domestic firms.
 Consequently, Mexican leaders would 
prefer renegotiations to end quickly, so the 
issue does not linger into election season. 
If it does, two problems arise for the ruling 
Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI). First, 
if Mexican President Ernesto Peña Nieto is 
perceived as having conceded too much, 
Mexico’s Congress will step up its criticism 
and opposition. The National Action Party 
(PAN), the main opposition party and a 
supporter of NAFTA, could break away from 
its support of the renegotiated agreement for 
fear of being perceived as too close to the PRI 
running up to the mid-2018 elections.
 Second, the left wing in Mexico likely will 
not support any revision of the agreement. It 
can argue that NAFTA has actually been unfair 
to Mexico and Mexican workers and can score 
more electoral points the longer negotiations 
last. The left has in fact threatened that it will 
seek to renegotiate the agreement itself. 
 Thus, renegotiating NAFTA in the 
second half of 2017 and first half of 2018 
carries with it enormous political risks for 
Mexico. The ruling PRI party could pursue 
tough negotiating tactics to win electoral 
points. Alternatively, it could aim for fast 
renegotiation, making important concessions, 
hoping the issue fades quickly. Both risk a 
party change in the upcoming elections. If 
that happens, trade may not be the only 
Mexican policy that NAFTA winds up changing.
It is possible that growing trade among 
NAFTA members did not translate to total 
trade growth across all U.S. trade partners.
 Trade and economic integration are 
not intrinsically valuable, as exemplified by 
points 6 and 7. We should care instead about 
related changes in consumption, jobs, and 
general well-being. If we can afford more 
Volkswagens when they come from Mexico 
instead of Germany or Brazil, we are better 
off. A struggling U.S. car company may be 
able to reduce the number of U.S. job losses 
if, by shifting some production stages to 
Mexico, it retains global competitiveness. 
 Measures of general well-being are 
much harder to link to trade, of course. 
NAFTA renegotiation may lead to big 
improvements for certain small groups of 
people. On a nationwide scale, NAFTA does 
not appear to have been a game changer, 
and its renegotiation will not be either. 
SOURCE  McDaniel and Agama, 2003.7
FIGURE 6 — U.S. TARIFFS FOR MEXICO, CANADA, AND NON-NAFTA 
PARTNERS
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ENDNOTES
 1. Services and petroleum products were 
not affected by NAFTA. They are a large 
component of U.S.-Mexico trade, however. 
We omit them here because, for instance, 
fluctuations in the price of oil can obscure 
trends in NAFTA-related trade.
 2. The OECD classification used here 
removes product lines with mixed usage 
to ensure a clean estimate. Adding in 
goods that are commonly used for both 
intermediate and final consumption 
purposes, e.g., personal computers, the 
share of U.S. exports rises to 77 percent.  
The share of U.S. imports rises to 55 percent.
 3. Lorenzo Caliendo and Fernando Parro, 
“Estimates of the Trade and Welfare Effects 
of NAFTA,” The Review of Economic Studies 
82, no. 1 (2015): 1–44. 
 4. Note, these are aggregate tariff 
rates. Rates for individual goods doubtlessly 
deviated from this pattern. 
 5. Thomas Zylkin, “Beyond Tariffs: 
Quantifying Heterogeneity in the Effects 
of Free Trade Agreements,” March 2016, 
http://ow.ly/49Qa30bEmK4.
 6. Specifically, if imports are not 
subtracted from exports, the value of 
intermediate goods will be counted  
when they cross the border originally, 
and again whenever they cross at later 
production stages.
 7. Christine A. McDaniel and Laurie-Ann 
Agama, “The NAFTA Preference and U.S.-
Mexico Trade: Aggregate-Level Analysis,” 
World Economy (2003).
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